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Cable TV: Money to the People 
by mOMAS BROM and EDWARD KIRSHNER 
Only 14 cities now own and operate their own cable television systems. Yet it's a 
profitable business that seems a natural for municipal ownership. 
The city of Palo Alto, California, owns its own 
electric-power distribution network. The system 
earns $4 million a year for the city, and the Citizens 
of Palo Alto pay one-third less for electricity than 
residents of nearby cities with private utilities. As 
municipal income from such enterprises 'goes up, 
taxes, correspondingly, can go down. Right now Palo 
Alto is planning to expand its domain of profit· 
making enterprise one s~ep further into the fastest· 
growing branch of electronic media: cable television. 
Cable television normally has something of a 
science-fiction air about it. Thanks in large part to the 
spate of popular articles on the subject that have 
appeared over the last ten years, the words conjure up 
images of electronic newspapers, push-button bank 
withdrawals, and credit-card grocery orders. It's only 
a short step to a McLuhanesque global village: no one 
ever leaves home, and everyone has access to 
whatever anyone else knows or wants to sell. 
The technological reality of cable TV, of course, is 
quite different. By and large, local CATV systems 
consist of one or more receiving antennas built on a 
convenient hill, with cables wired down public streets 
to connect with people's homes. The high antenna 
allows reception of distant broadcast television 
signals. Instead of getting four fuzzy channels with 
your own antenna, you pay $5 a month to get ten 
clear channels from the CATV antenna. 
ntOMAS BROM is a freelance writer based in California. He 
was formerly communications director for American Doc· 
umentary Films, and has written widely on films and· 
television. EDWARD KIRSHNER is a city planner and 
activist specializing in municipal ownership and new town 
development. Both Brom and Kirshner are presently con· 
nected with the Community Ownership Organizing Project 
located in Oakland. 
What is important right now about cable TV isn't 
technology, it's economics. CATV is rapidly be· 
corning a multibillion dollar industry; with some of 
the country's largest corporations acquiring vast 
systems. At the same time, there is a small but 
growing co·untermove afoot toward municipal owner· 
ship of local systems. A few communities around the 
country have been asking themselves why the 
communications conglomerates should get all that 
money from a monopoly that the communities 
themselves franchise. 
Here's how the economics of cable TV work. An 
operator invests anywhere from $2-$3 million (for a 
small city) to $15 million (for a larger one). This 
investment pays for the antennas, cable, and other 
equipment; for the contracts necessary· to import 
distant broadcast signals; and for a sales campaign to 
enroll subscribers. From there on, it's mostly gravy. 
Cable maintenance, personnel, and overhead are 
minimal for the life of the system. Subscriber 
monthly fees are a guaranteed base income. Advertis· 
ing revenue, the source of all broadcaster profits, has 
yet to be explored. Pay cable, where a fee is paid to 
receive special programming and movies, has just 
begun in the hotels of major convention centers such 
as San Francisco. Channels leased for business data 
transmission may provide yet another source of 
income. Most systems expect to make profits by the 
fifth year of operation, with income spiraling 
thereafter through the life of the franchise. 
At the moment, America's communications em-
pires are battling with each other over who gets the 
biggest foot in the door. In June 1973, TelePrompTer 
Corporation had 800,000 subscribers; Warner Cable 
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Corporation, a subsidiary of Warner Communications, 
had 450,000, and Tele-Communications, Inc., a 
Denver-based firm, was third with 387,000. Viacom 
International (a spinoff from CBS), Athena Com-
munications (a spinoff from Gulf & Western), Cox 
Cable Communications, and UA-Columbia Cable- , 
vision are among the other big firms developing (or 
purchaSing) cable systems. In 1972, the top 12 firms 
accounted for more than half of the 5.5 million cable 
subscribers then enrolled. According to one estimate, 
annual cable TV income will be $4.4 billion in 1980. 
Aside from competition from the other giants, cable 
TV operators generally face only bne hitch. Because 
cables must be strung over or under public streets, 
operators· must secure a franchise from each town 
government before they build. Such agreements are 
commonly signed for a period of 15 to 25 years, with 
2-5 percent of the gross subscriber receipts paid to 
the municipality. Recently, revenue-starved cities and 
towns have been balking at giving away the franchise. 
A small number have actually set up their own 
municipally owned systems. 
The prime example is San Bruno, California, a 
suburb of 40,000 people 20 miles south of San 
Francisco. After several early feelers from cable 
operators, San Bruno performed its own CATV 
feasibility study and marketing analysis in 1968. City 
Manager Gerard S. Vergeer concluded, "a cable TV 
utility operation is entirely feasible and would 
provide additional general fund revenue in substantial 
amount after repayment of the capital outlay." 
San Bruno, which operates many of its other city 
services, was able to borrow $505.000 from surplus 
generated by the water· department to begin CATV 
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construction in 1970. The Stanford Research Insti-
tute offered to investigate and predict the financial 
expectations for the San Bruno system in 1971; it 
reported that in the seventh and following years 'of 
operation, the city would earn profits of $204,000 a 
year. And that figure included income from monthly 
subscriber fees alone. 
In March 1972, after six months of operation, 
revenues were so high that the second stage of 
construction was begun a year ahead of schedule. 
According to the most recent cash-flow charts, the 
$100,000 one-year improvement loan from the public 
works fund will be repaid in only nine months. 
Presently CATV reaches 58 percent of the potential 
subscribers in San Bruno; the feasibility study 
projected profits at a 45 percent figure. 
San Bruno has one of only 14 municipally owned 
CATV systems in the country. And with a population 
of just 40,000 it is still twice as populous as any of 
the other 13 cities. Nonetheless, more and more 
localities have had private feasibility studies per-
formed on municipal CATV development. Palo Alto 
is committed to municipal ownership and plans to 
finance a good deal of locally originated program-
ming. A mammoth Rand study of the Dayton, Ohio, 
metropolitan area offered municipal-regional CATV 
as one of the feasible options. The entire province of 
British Columbia in Canada is currently estimating 
the benefits of both CATV and telephone operation 
as public utilities; the mayor of Vancouver recently 
gave the concept his approval. Waiting in the wings 
are such towns as Tonawanda, New York, Culver . 
City, California, and a five-city regional CATV 
authority in the Huntington Beach area of California. 
In Detroit, the CATV cpmrnission recently re-
leased a 162-page report advocating municipalization. 
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Detroit is the sixth largest media market in the 
country; municipal ownership there would surely 
mark a watershed in CATV franchise policy. 
Where Will it Work? 
Not all cable systems will be as easy to set up or as 
immediately profitable as San Bruno's. One problem 
is fmancing. Despite the potentially high profitability 
of CATV operations over the life of a 15 to 25-year 
franchise, the capitalization of such an operation is a 
serious undertaking. The sheer magnitude of the 
operation, coupled with the complex technology, 
continues to persuade many cities to grant private 
CATV franchises rather than undertake the enterprise 
themselves. 
Cities like San Bruno and Palo Ait·::J have a history 
of municipal ownership of basic utilities; their 
citizens are used to the idea, and there are often· city 
funds available for initial capitalization. Other local-
ities may not be so fortunate. But bonding authority 
is often available, and cities may be able to attract 
financing that way. 
Whether a city can fmance a CATV system and 
whether it should do so, of course, are two separate 
matters. Among the profitability factors are geog-
raphy, quality of broadcast reception, proximity to 
cities in the top 50 or 100 media markets, population 
density, and local requirements on cable connections. 
In the majority of American cities and small towns, 
municipal cable is not only feasible but enormously 
profitable on subscriber revenues alone. The present 
exceptions are rural areas where population density is 
so low that monthly revenues would not cover 
construction and equipment costs, and in some of the 
largest urban suburbs with excellent broadcast recep-
tion. Federal subsidy, similar to Rural Electrification 
Administration loans for rural telephone systems, 
would make the former fmancially feasible. The 
utban systems are more complex, caught in the 
present battle between competing technologies and 
.economic interests. 
The latest set of CATV regulations issued by the 
Federal Communications Commission-the Third Re-
port and Order-made things very difficult for cable 
systems operating in the top 50 markets. Those 
difficulties are in large measure a result of constant 
and vigorous lobbying by the National Association of 
Broadcasters, culminating in revised urban-cable-
policy guidelines issued by the FCC on February 2, 
1972. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson immediately 
labeled that decision "a patchwork of prc.tectionism, 
designed to foster the interests of vested economic 
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institutions at the expense of ihe public," and "a cold 
and smog-filled day" for CATY. 
Briefly, the new rules provided "exclusivity" 
contracts to broadcasters for certain programming 
that could not be picked up by CATV systems. They 
also severely limited CATV importation of distant 
broadcast signals and forbade "leapfrogging" whereby 
a CATV system might skip over nearby broadcasters 
in favor of importing more distant stations. 
The net effect was to protect local broadcasting 
interests in the big markets. CATV systems in these 
markets are also required to provide locally originated 
programming and will be required to provide a free 
government channel, educational channel, and public-
access channel by 1977. These CATV services are not 
required in the smaller media markets, where, 
ironically, subscriber revenues are generally higher 
than in the cities. 
All of this has produced a situation where many 
big-city cable systems are not immediately profitable 
on revenue from subscribers alone. Advertising, pay 
cable, and various ancillary services will no doubt 
insure the profitability of urban systems in the near 
future. But ·at present, the media conglomerates write 
off the losses (both real and fictional) againSt taxable 
income earned elsewhere. 
Municipal cable systems have no such latitude. 
One alternative is for cities to create a partnership 
that would allow private investors to claim losses for 
tax purposes. The investors would in turn provide up 
to 25 percent of the venture capital. Otherwise, 
municipalities would have to absorb losses until 
sufficient urban cable services were developed to 
provide operating revenues,. or until broadcast protec-
tionist policies eased. That period might be relatively 
short, but cities contemplating municipal ownership 
must consider fmancing through the lean years. 
"Unfair Competition" 
In most cases, all of these caveats put together appear 
insignificant when compared to the potential benefits 
of municipal ownership. Cable TV systems are 
essentially simple, long-lived, low-maintenance com-
munications networks with enormous public value. 
And, since most localities don't yet have cable 
facilities, the time is ripe to explore and develop the 
possibilities of municipal ownership. 
It won't always be easy. Private cable companies, 
organized into the National Cable Television Associa· 
tion, are none too happy with the prospect of 
competition from nonprofit, municipally owned 
systems. The nation's second largest city-owned 
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system, in Frankfort, Kentucky, provides a good 
example of the political obstacles that public 1V 
operations are likely to face. 
Frankfort's system is unusual, in that it was 
established more than 20 years ago; the city is located 
in a river valley area that prevents good broadcast 
reception. Like San Bruno, Frankfort operates a 
municipal water department and owns its electric 
distribution system. In 1952, the city utility plant 
board formed a non-stock, nonprofit company to. 
operate the system, and insulated the municipal 
CA1V board from local political interference. Citi· 
zens receive cable service for $2.50 a month, less than 
half the national average, and the city has still been 
able to support the Chamber of Commerce and ~he 
United Fund generously from subscriber revenues. 
But meanwhile the City council of East Frankfort 
had issued a nonexclusive CATV franchise to Consoli· 
dated TV Cable Service, a private operator. As both 
systems expanded to increase saturation and thereby 
to lower subscriber costs, they inevitably came into 
conflict. Operating on a nonprofit basis, able to 
secure low-interest loans from the city, and offering 
high-quality service for low subscriber fees, the city 
system grew faster than the private one. In January 
1973, Consolidated petitioned the FCC for relief, 
with full support from the National Cable Television 
Association. The firm charged "discriminatory con-
duct" by the city and its CATV system, official 
refusal to renew Consolidated's pole-line-attachment 
agreement, and refusal of permission to expand the 
system. In the statement of support, NCTA claimed 
"these actions occurred precisely because the city 
owns a CATV system." The organization asked 
rhetorically, "What would be the attitude if the city 
owned the only newspaper in town, or the only radio 
station, or the only television station?" It added, "It 
seems particularly important to us that any medium 
of mass communications should not fall into the 
hands of government. The potential for abuse is 
self-evident. A portion of that potential has already 
been realized in Frankfort." 
Government abuse, of course, would be a problem 
only if the abusing government agency were beyond 
public control; otherwise the presumption must be 
that it is private interests, rather than the citizenry, 
that are being abused. Cities such as Frankfort and 
most recently Palo Alto have gone to great lengths to 
ensure CATV accountability, for example by a 
governing board that is part of the city government. 
Whatever the theoretical dangers of government 
control may be, the public accountability of such a 
board is surely several orders of magnitude greater 
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than the accountability of private corporations, most 
. of whom in the CATV industry operate from 
headquarters in New York City. But residual fears run 
deep, however irrational they may be. The city of 
Cupertino, California, dismissed further discussion of 
municipal CA 1V precisely because fears of govern-
ment control ran so high. The Detroit study 
commission majority recommended a municipally 
owned, publicly controlled CAtv system, but several 
spokesmen in the minority were nearly apoplectic in 
dissent. The arguments run the gamut from the 
dangers of government control to the notion that 
public ownership will be a further cause for private 
businesses to leave the city. 
The national campaign now being waged by the 
NCTA to ·outlaw municipal and nonprofit CATV 
systems shows to what extent the cable industry 
appreciates the specter of increased competition. The 
people of Chicopee, Massachusetts, and Columbia, 
Missouri, had a chance to see the cable industry's 
campaign in action in November of 1972, when both 
cities had CATV measures on the ballot. 
In Chicopee, a referendum was placed before the 
voters asking, "Should your state representative 
support a municipally owned cable system?" The 
NCTA Bulletin of January 13, 1973, describes with 
pride the efforts of the local CATV operator, 
Spectrum Communications, to control opinion on the 
issue. 
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They chose a multimedia approach which intensified 
during the last ten days before the election. Fitst they 
purchased program time on two radio stations for 
saturation spots. Then they secured time on the 
call-In talk shows of these two radio stations. I J. 
Orrin/ Marlowe {vice-president} and George Town-
send, the president of Spectrum Communications, 
presented their views on these shows and then 
answered questions telephoned in by the listening 
audience. Newspaper ads were also purchased to back 
up the live presentation. Marlowe estimates that the 
entire campaign cost his company approximately 
$1,000. 
With little organized backing for the opposite side, 
the measure, predictably enough, was defeated by 
more than two to one. 
In Columbia, Missouri, the referendum appeared as 
a proposal for raising a revenue bond issue to finance 
a municipally owned cable system. On measures 
concerned with bonding, the local government was 
forbidden to advocate an affirmative vote. The 
Columbia Tribune, not so bound, nonetheless editori· 
alized, "The most basic reason for opposing the bond 
isaue il limply that the city should not be in the 
communication• and entertainment business." This 
time a simple majority of the voters approved iasuing 
the bonds, but a four·aevenths vote wu needed for 
puaap. 
Once apin the NCTA Bulletin glowed with pride. 
Certalnly the atr:uggle for community ownership will 
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not be an easy one. But cities have a lot at stake, and 
a variety of tools at their disposal. For those that 
have already granted franchises, condemnation pro-
ceedings-perhaps based on the misrepresentation 
that has been a hallmark of franchise battles across 
the country-can provide a threat sufficient to force 
public sale bf the system. Most model franchise 
ordinances, including those provided by the League 
of California Cities and the National Institute of 
Municipal Law Officers, include a clause reserving the 
right for the city to "amend any section of this 
ordinance so as to require additional or greater 
standards of construction, operation, maintenance or 
otherwise." A city that wanted to own and operate 
its system could pressure the private owner into 
selling through increased demands and strict regula-
tion, coupled with the threat of eminent domain. It 
could then simply buy the system outright. 
Financing, for purchase of an existing system or 
construction of a new one, will normally be available 
through bonding or borrowing. Municipal bonds are 
tax-exempt, and thus carry lower interest rates than 
other forms of borrowing. Minority communities 
wouid in addition be eligible for federal funds, for 
example through a MESBIC minority enterprise loan. 
Each week, Variety reports more and more cities that 
are commiasioning special CATV feasibility reports 
and citizen study groups. Securing a private franchise 
is not nearly as simple as it was only five years ago. 
And if even one major city, such as Detroit, makes a 
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commitment for municipal ownership, then the 
CATV scenario planned by the industrial giants may 
be radically altered. 
Surely it is a race against time: whether enough 
communities can wake up to the potential of cable 
before some kind of prohibiting legislation is passed. 
With control of communications go vast amounts of 
money and power, a truism not lost on the current 
hierarchy of communications conglomerates. Local 
communities can pre-empt the corporate vision of the 
CATV future, and they can provide revenues for 
other services in the bargain. Feasibility studies are 
not lacking. Technical and financial help is available. 
Support from established community-owned systems 
has already been offered by San Bruno, Palo Alto, 
and others. What remains is for community organ-
izers,. interest groups, and their representatives on 
town councils across the nation to take over cable 
1V -and thus to return a little more power to the 
hands of the people. 
• 
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., 
comment 
Working Papers from time to time solicits comments 
on major articles. Unsolicited comments from readers 
are welcome as well. 
In the last issue of Working Papers, Thomas Brom and 
Edward Kirshner outlined a proposal for municipal 
ownership of cable television systems. Municipal 
ownership, they argued, would provide a source of 
revenue to the city, and would allow public control 
of cable programming. The following comments are 
excerpted from a longer exchange concerning this 
article. 
Cable TV: What's It Worth? 
1 Brom and Kirshner too easily assume that public 
ownership means public control and public use. Much 
of what has passed for "socialism"-e.g., nationaliza-
tion-should dissuade us from that delusion. 
Cable is a new technology. Its use is pre~ently in 
the hands of large corporations: both the hardware 
{the cable) and the software {the programming). The 
problem I see is how we can demythologize ~he use of 
this technology so that people can see what's in it for 
them in terms of personal and community involve-
ment and development. Why bother about ownership 
if you don't see any use? Why not just leave it to 
Time-Life and your local video freak? 
2 Even if people do come to see some use, who's 
going to pay for programming? The easy ·answer is 
that programming will be financed out of profits. But 
{a) there may not be any profits; and (b) there 
perhaps should not be any profits. Shouldn't rates be 
set low so that more people can have the benefit of 
the technology? Finally, even if there are profits, the 
costs of programining would be substantially greater 
than the profits. Ten or twelve hours a day on ten or 
twelve channels is a lot of money. {And this does not 
even get us into the question of how professional 
such programming has to be to attract people away 
from network TV.) 
3 I am especially disappointed that a piece in 
Working Papers is so vague in its financial analysis. 
The enormous difference in costs between urban and 
suburban systems is not articulated. Just for laying 
the cable, for example, these costs range from $6,000 
per mile for overhead wiring in suburban areas to over 
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$125,000 per mile for underground wiring in New 
York City {though the cost per home passed is 
probably not so variable). Maintenance costs have 
proven much higher in urban systems; and "stealing" 
the signals has proven technologically easier in 
apartments than in single-family homes. 
In the future, urban areas will require many more 
data transmission facilities for hospitals, police, 
planning, and business than suburban areas. Urban 
areas will also require more sophisticated computer 
. switching and monitoring equipment. 
4 There is little awareness of the complexity of the 
rate and standards problems deriving from FCC and 
state regulations. Nor is there much awareness of the 
problems inherent {for most state~) in revenue 
bonding for cable systems. 
5 Finally, I am not sure that municipal ownership is 
the direction public ownership should take. Municipal 
boundaries are too restrictive. There are more public 
concerns than fit easily into municipal concerns: 
federal, state, regional, neighborhood, etc. I would 
argue for a broader concept of the public corpora-
tion. It would include all major users of the systems 
and focus on the problems of use, not on those of 
building and maintaining the system. If we are 
thinking of arranging communications technology to 
serve communities, let us think of whole communities 
and not be bounded by such old restrictions as 
municipal or school-district boundaries. 
The authors reply: 
-Thomas Hai'gadon 
Belmont, Massachusetts 
Let us respond to Mr. Hargadon's points in order. 
1 We never meant to imply that formal public 
ownership would automatically produce ideal public 
control and public use. Local public ownership does, 
however, allow more public control than the absentee 
monopoly ownership that currently characterizes the 
CATV industry; Moreover, community ownership is 
not the same as "nationalization." {Not that we 
_would fault all examples of nationalization: some are 
profitable, some are even decentralized, some have an 
extent of worker and community control-and, of 
course, many are superior to private corporate 
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ownership.) The main point of local community 
ownership is to show that smaller, decentralized 
economic units controlled and run by the public can 
work. Naturally, the community must be active and 
vigilant if it is to control the enterprises. 
Suggesting that public ownership moves aren't 
worth the effort until broad sections of the public are 
aware of CATV's potential is like saying there's no 
point struggling for any change until a Gallup poll 
reports that a 58 percent majority of the public wants 
it. What better way to demythologize the technology 
of cable TV than public ownership of the basic cable 
grid? 
2 The editing of our CATV article, especially the 
slant of the title (which was not ours), may have 
overemphasized the purely economic aspr cts of cable 
TV. The question of who pays for local programming 
is indeed troublesome, regardless of who owns the 
system. Of course CATV rates should be low enough 
to attract subscribers. But the public should realize 
that it must pay for its own programming if it expects 
true independence from those who produce it. ' 
"Free" TV is inevitably produced within limits set by 
advertisers. 
Local CATV programming produced in the studio 
or with portable video equipment can be done fm a · 
fraction of what broadcast TV or film production 
would cost. Certainly the initial investment in 
equipment means thousands of ,dollars, but video 
access centers in New York, Washington, Chicago, 
and other cities show that high-quality programming 
can be produced with limited public funds. 
Also, the economics of CATV are relative. On 
balance, municipal systems (or nonprofit systems 
with municipal backing) have a clear advantage over 
the private model. Just to note two areas: the cost of 
capital for the municipal system can be as inuch as 50 
percent leu than that of private systems, thanks to 
public financing possibilities; and when net revenues 
are generated after the lean early years, the public 
systems need not pay corporate income taxes. 
Depending on the approach taken, costs would be 
correspondingly less or profits · correspondingly 
greater. 
3 Complete fmancial feasibility studies are available 
from us for the public CATV systems in San Bruno 
and Palo Alto, California. San Bruno has two years of 
operating experience as well, with all financial data 
included in the annual reports from the public works 
department. 
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Of course CATV systems built in large urban 
areas must be correspondingly more complex and 
expensive. But if CATV is viewed as a sovereign 
community service, the public expense is justified. 
Large urban areas like Los Angeles, Seattle, Tacoma, 
Jacksonville, and Cleveland have efficient, profitable, 
low-cost public power facilities. Like power facilities, 
sophisticated telecommunications and data transmis-
sion systems will be built in cities anyway. The 
question is w-ho will design them, and for what 
pu~pose. 
4 There is little doubt in our minds of the 
complexity of all aspects of FCC and state regulation 
of.. the CATV industry in particular, and of local 
public ownership schemes. in general. This has not 
caused the relatively small CATV industry to cease 
fighting the larger broadcasting corporations, nor has 
it deterred CATV advisory boards in Detroit, Sacra· 
mento, and Seattle from recollllllending municipal 
ownership. 
State restrictions on municipal revenue bond 
issues are another hindrance to public cable develop· 
ment. But in many cases those restrictions were 
placed there 50 years ago to block the development 
of public power systems. To date there are over 2,000 
such systems, built in spite of private utility and state 
legislative resistance. Also, revenue bonds are not the 
only way of fmancing a community-owned CATV 
system. General obligation bonds. or low-interest 
loans may also be available. And most cities have 
significant savings and surpluses. For example, San 
Francisco has almost $1 billion collected in its 
pension funds, enterprise reserves, budget ·balances, 
etc. A complete, good-quality CATV system for the 
city would run between $25 and $50 million at most 
So it would not be difficult for San Francisco to 
build its system outright from funds it borrowed 
from itself, in the same way San Bruno financed its 
CATV system. 
S Certainly municipal boundaries are not an ideal 
definition of "community." Municipal incorporation 
is just a legal fiction, approximating a group of 
neighborhoods within geographical boundaries. But 
that legal fiction can be used to serve the public 
purpose. Where public utility districts or regional 
associations are more appropriate and have sufficient 
public input, they should supersede parochial inter- · 
ests, which may have limited access to akllled 
workers, talent, and capital. Otherwise, municipalities 
have proven effective on all counts for the public 
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power industry, providing low-cost energy, efficient 
service, and public control. 
In any case, most cities, if they can undertake 
CATV at all, can also go beyond their boundaries 
(individually or in association with others). For 
example, Palo Alto is considering an areawide system 
and has the legal power, in one way or another, to do 
it. Similarly, in the Sacramento area, it is the regional 
utility district and not the city itself that is 
considering a public CATV system. 
Finally, one additional point to note: municipal 
ownership and programming control can be separate. 
Especially in larger systems, they probably should be 
so. For example, we worked on an initiative for 
municipal CATV in San Francisco. The citywide 
system was to be subdivided into community-control 
districts representing as closely as possible recogniz-
able sections of the city. There would have been both 
elected local boards and a general board. Program-
ming and operations were to be local, while the 
association. would have taken care of financing and 
other economic considerations. We attempted to 
develop an ability-to-pay fee structure, and had 
systemwide surpluses distributed to the local areas 
inversely to income level. The surpluses were to be 
used for programming up to a given percentage, with 
any remainder going to other community economic 
development or services. The San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors would have had virtually no control of 
the system, but would technically own it for 
financing and tax purposes. Not enough support has 
been generated for the initiative and it is now in 
abeyance, but we believe the principle should hold. 
-Thomas Brom 
Edward Kirshner 
COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP ORGANIZING PROJECT (COOP) 
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